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Abstract 
The paper established that oil based federalism has failed the Niger Delta. Oil rents/royalties has induced the 
Nigerian state to have systematically operated a federal structure that is suffocating the Niger Delta, which 
manifested in the glaring absence of basic amenities, the unpleasant environmental circumstances for hosting oil 
facilities, the physical menace from the Joint Task Force (JTF), etc. Youth restiveness became the direct result of 
perceived and real material deprivations in the recent past. The paper concluded that the peace resulting from the 
Presidential Amnesty Programme for ex-militants is only but temporal, unless a sense of and real indicators of 
sustainable federalism such as fiscal federalism, environmental federalism, environmental sustainability, 
livelihood sustenance, basic material provisions, etc, are introduced in the Niger Delta.  
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                             Among the many constitutions proposed by philosophy and put to 
the test by history, one alone reconciles the demands of justice, 
order, liberty and stability, without which neither society nor the 
individual can live…this one constitution is nothing other than the 
federal system. 
                             --Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
 
1. Introduction 
A federal constitution, as Proudhon (2005:173) observed above, presupposed the existence of distinct entities 
and diversities for federating units. These diversities exhibit characteristic patterns as (a) forces of unity, (b) 
forces of disunity and (c) a point of compromise between (a) and (b) which form the foundation for any federal 
system (Dikshit, 1971; Ohwona, 1995). The agreement-disagreement-compromise triple helix
2
 (representing the 
symbiotic relations yoking together federating units) opened to federalism is a medium of meeting the needs and 
solving problems of a diverse people (Akinola and Adesopo, 2011). Federalism has the efficacy in promoting 
healthy interactions, sometimes conflictual but eventual compromises that lead to the enjoyment of liberties, 
opportunities and social amenities (Elazar, 1971; Awa, 1976; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997).  
The liberties and opportunities, in form of basic life sustaining amenities, envisaged from federalism are a far cry 
in the oil rich Niger Delta, Nigeria. But why is it that a region so rich in oil and gas resources lives in abject 
poverty, with its attendant environmental and social consequences of hosting the oil and gas industry in Nigeria? 
Why is the region rather saddled with avoidable conflicts, which sometimes resulted in unpleasant consequences 
(Watts, 2008ed; Watts, 2010; Aaron and George, 2010eds)? In the midst of such suffocating discomfort to oil 
communities, the oil in the Niger Delta sustains Nigeria’s ego seen displayed within the West African sub-region 
and in international arenas as the African Union, United Nations, etc, (Mayall, 1976; Ihonvbere, 1982, 1991; 
Shaw, 1983; Adedipe, 2004; Adeniji, 2005; Ambe-Uwa, et al, 2007; Meierding, 2010). Thus, the whole question 
of a federal system meeting the wishes and aspirations of the citizens is secondary. Oil dependence dictates the 
type of political institutions and policy regimes successive governments in Nigeria have offered on the table for 
the Niger Delta region (Smith, 2008). Such issues in contemporary federal system in Nigeria have propelled this 
paper in the context of investigating the factors that have ensured that the administration and management of 
Nigeria’s federalism remain contentious, controversial and conflict prone. The rest of the paper is in five parts. 
Immediately following this introduction is a conceptual clarification on federalism and fiscal federalism. 
Thereafter, section three identifies and discusses trajectories of selective federalism in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. 
The fourth and fifth sections draw conclusions and recommendations from the paper.   
 
2. Conceptual Clarity 
2.1 Federalism 
Federalism remains a widely discussed concept, yet the definitional problematique would not go away. 
Interestingly, therefore, plethora definitions engulf the academic discourse on federalism (Livingston, 1952; 
Wheare, 1963; Gamper, 2005; Sagay, 2008). Wheare (1963) in consonance with his self caution that “where 
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common usage differs so much, the academic man must be careful not to adopt too rigid a definition” (p.1), gave 
a simplified definition of the federal principle as “the method of dividing powers so that the general and 
regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent (p.10)…that each government 
should be limited to its own sphere and, within that sphere, should be independent of the other” (p.14). Kenneth 
Clinton Wheare’s definition qualified federalism as simply regulatory federalism (Super, 2005), a system where 
the centre and the component units have mutual independence and acts as co-ordinates. But while stressing the 
element of independence of the various levels of governments in a federal system as pioneered by most federalist 
scholars, commensurate stress has never been placed on the interdependent elements in a federal system.   
Scholars have proposed a mutual interdependence perspective on federalism. Renowned American federal 
scholar, M.J.C. Vile (1961:199) proposed “a mutually interdependent political relationship; in this system a 
balance is maintained such that neither level of government becomes dominant to the extent that it can dictate 
the decisions of the other, but each can influence, bargain with, and persuade the other…where each level is to 
some degree dependent upon the other, particularly in relation to matters which vitally affect the other 
level…there is a balance of power between federal and state governments which reflects very well the way in 
which a federal system is in fact operated” (p.197). He cautioned that if the component units depend on the 
centre while the centre remaining independent, then it is unitary government instead of federalism. Also, if the 
component units are independent of the centre while the centre remains dependent on the regions a confederation 
is in place rather than federalism. Vile concludes that “between these extremes lies the federation-a system of 
government in which neither level of government is wholly dependent upon the other, nor wholly independent of 
the other” (p.197). 
In a similar vein, Ranjit Sarkaria (in Elaigwu, 2002:84) posited that “the classical concept of federation which 
envisaged two parallel governments of co-ordinate jurisdiction, operating in isolation from each other in 
watertight compartments, is no where a functional reality now. With the emergence of the Social Welfare State, 
the traditional theory of federalism completely lost its ground. After the First World War, it became very much a 
myth even in the old federations... By the middle of the twentieth century, federalism had come to be understood 
as dynamic process of cooperation and shared action between two or more levels of government, with increasing 
interdependence and centrist trends”.  
From the discussion so far, the point is made that a federal system exists when power is shared between a central 
government and components units. As a form of government, it is usually adopted in heterogeneous societies 
where people of diverse origins unite to form a common government, wherein unity in diversity is preserved 
(Jinadu, 1979, Proudhon, 2005). Though diversity is expressed in culture, language, religion, and even 
geography (Dikshit, 1971), they are united for political and economic gains (Riker, 1975). Politically, the 
constituents give up political autonomy for security reasons (Mill, 2005). Economically, the aim is to achieve a 
common market (Rodden and Ackerman, 1997) and an optimal provision of public goods (Sharma, 2003). 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) also posited that people desiring federal governments do so for a mix of three 
reasons: (a) “an efficient allocation of national resources”, (b) ensuring “political participation and a sense of the 
democratic community” and (c) to “protect basic liberties and freedom”.  
From a legal perspective, Appadorai (2004) examined federalism as a system of government where powers of 
the state are duly allotted to different levels of government by the constitution. Thus, in a federal system, the 
constitution serves as the source of power and where state functions are categorized into the exclusive (functions 
performed by the centre, e.g. defense, currency), the concurrent (functions jointly by the centre and component 
units, e.g. education, health), and the residual lists. Furthermore, all federal states are bound by written and rigid 
constitutions and a supreme court, which necessitate the fact that matters specifically stated in the exclusive, 
concurrent and residual lists cannot be altered either by the federal government acting alone and the state 
government acting alone (Wheare, 1941). One area in the federal principle where the constitution plays a 
dominant role, especially in ensuring mutual interdependence among the federating units is fiscal federalism, the 
subject of the next section.    
2.2 Fiscal Federalism 
Fiscal intergovernmental relations or fiscal decentralization, as political economists call it, is awash with 
numerous contributions from Samuelson (1954), Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972, 1977), Sharma (2005) and 
Bamgbose (2008). According to Oates (1999) fiscal federalism is concerned with “understanding which 
functions and instruments are best centralized and which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of 
government". For Pierre-Henrie (1991:19) “fiscal federalism, it is all in once, the territorial organization of a 
country; the principle underlying repartition of powers, competencies, public revenues and expenditures 
between hierarchical levels of government; and the degree of territorial centralization/decentralization of 
territorial administration. It is thus a set of precepts underlying the conduct of public actions in more or less 
decentralized states”. In furthering the frontiers of the discussion, Sharma (2003) posited that “a federal 
approach is…a dynamically balanced approach; one that constantly keeps on adjusting the contrasting forces of 
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centralization and decentralization to create a system that can ensure good governance in accordance with the 
rapidly changing global and local scenario…the good governance of the present time has to be federally flexible 
and dynamically decentralized and institutions of fiscal federalism are crucial for achieving such a dynamic 
equilibrium”.  
Extending the discourse from above, scholars identify fiscal federalism as one major component of mutual 
interdependence between the centre and regional governments and a crucial determinant of the continued 
survival of federal states, as an improperly constituted fiscal structure remains a perpetual source of 
intergovernmental wrangles in federal states (Oworawo, 2012). The likely skirmishes would emanate from the 
inability of various levels of government to meet their respective political and constitutional responsibilities. 
Though the constitution remains the power source in a federal state, Olaloku (1979:109) pinpoint the “nature of 
the functions and revenue sources of the three levels of government” as one among three reasons for revenue 
transfers from a central level to a lower level of government. He further stated that where “…an 
imbalance…develop between revenues and responsibilities. It then becomes the duty of the higher level of 
government to make good such an imbalance by making transfers of financial resources”.  
Achieving financial transfers from the centre to component levels of government compelled federalist to 
introduce specific principles in guiding revenue sharing. Among the several principles that readily come to mind 
include derivation, need, national interest, efficiency, fiscal equalization, diversity, etc (Ariyo, 2003; Kalu, 2011). 
These guiding principles notwithstanding, fiscal autonomy is crucial in achieving coordinate relations between 
the centre and the regional governments for “financial subordination makes an end of federalism” (Wheare, 
1941:17).   
Government role in the provision of public goods
3
 as a means of ensuring the welfare of the citizens is the basis 
of fiscal federalism. Government remains the sole custodian of public interest and the provision of public goods 
is her most sacred of all duties in a democracy. The bed-rock of any true federal system is the typology of fiscal 
federalism practiced by the federating units. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the guiding principles 
of fiscal federalism as outlined above are carefully followed in Nigeria’s practice of federalism.        
 
3. Trajectories of Selective Federalism in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
The basis of the Niger Delta question has been “that a region which accounts for 90% of Nigeria's revenue be 
developed; that the means of livelihood of its inhabitants have been greatly hampered by the exploration 
activities that feed the rest of the nation. The question is about a fair deal for some very endangered Nigerians in 
Nigeria” (Hosiah Emmanuel in Ibodje, 2008). However, the failure of successive governments in Nigeria to 
address to the Niger Delta question compelled the restiveness experienced in the Niger Delta in the recent past. 
Presently, an unusual kind of peace, the typology Zalik (2004) qualifies as “the peace of the graveyard” currently 
envelopes the creeks of the Niger Delta. The temporal peace is assumed to be prevailing for two reasons, the 
Presidency of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Niger Delta indigene, as Nigeria’s president and the Presidential 
Amnesty granted to the former militants. However, the prevailing peace is unsustainable as the circumstances 
and conditions that compelled the erstwhile restive environment in the Niger Delta still stare the inhabitants in 
the face. What is that is so difficult on the part of the Nigerian government to holistically address the Niger Delta 
question? Is it attributable to ethnicity politics? An unholy desire for oil rents? Is it a weapon to subjugate Niger 
Delta ethnic minorities? Such questions have propelled this paper in the context of investigating the factors that 
have ensured the development paralysis in the Niger Delta.       
3.1 Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria  
One issue that has come to crowd-out the modus-operandi of good governance and true federalism shortly after 
political independence is the politically influenced intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria (Adedotun, 1991; 
Ikein and Briggs-Anigboh, 1998; Odubajo, 2011; Anyadike, 2013). It may be recalled that derivation principle 
was the rule of the day when Nigeria’s major ethnic groups dominated the economic spheres of Nigeria and thus 
felt economically self reliant to attempt secession at different times of Nigeria’s political history (Ayaode, 1973). 
In this respect, legislators of Northern extraction in one of their 8-point demands for continued loyalty to Nigeria 
in the 1950s request “that all revenue shall be levied and collected by the regional government except customs 
revenue at the port of discharge by the central agency and paid to its treasury. The administration of the customs 
shall be so organized as to assure that goods consigned to the Region are separately cleared and charged to 
duty” (Akinola and Adesopo, 2011:253). According to Ayoade (1973:72) between 1953-1957 when the “world 
price of cocoa was very high the Western Region perceived itself rich enough to finance itself as a sovereign 
state. It argued that it was contributing more to running the federation than it ever gained from it…we think, 
very natural that those who have up to now, at great losses to themselves, been making by far the largest 
financial contributions to the development of Nigeria as a whole…and who are spited and insulted into the 
bargain, should insist on standing on their own rights, at least for a change…This economic interpretation also 
at least partially explains the Eastern threats of secession from 1964”. It was no wonder, monies realized from 
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crops or minerals were utilized by the respective regions to embark on well meaning projects/edifices that are of 
much envy up to this day. For example, the use of the proceeds by the various ethnic groups to build universities 
for themselves: Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria (Northern region), Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife 
(Western region), and the University of Nigeria, Nsukka (Eastern region).   
Sadly, the discovery of oil and the subsequent dominance of oil as the mainstay of the Nigerian economy met a 
change in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. A centralized fiscal system was introduced so much to the detriment of the 
Niger Delta, which Melford Okilo (erstwhile governor of old Rivers State, Nigeria) argued that “derivation as a 
principle of revenue allocation has continued to be deliberately suppressed since crude oil became the mainstay 
of the country’s wealth simply because the main contributors of the oil wealth are the minorities” (Akinola and 
Adesopo, 2011). Chief Obafemi Awolowo also argued that “where the opponents of the principle of derivation 
believe that they have the advantage of numbers, they insists on all the revenues being collected into a common 
pool and then shared out on the basis of population, where this advantage is absent, they still insist on a 
common purse from which allocation to all concerned should be made on the basis of equality” (see Ikein, 
2008:87). Thus, revenue allocation based on derivation was abandoned for a number of conditions that 
discouraged hard work, such as equality per state, population, social development, land mass, and revenue 
generation. Therefore instead of revenue generation, revenue sharing became the order of the day with the 
consequences of such practices (the decay in the political, social and economic spheres in the country) still 
staring Nigerians in their faces (Ojo, 2010).   
Furthermore, the prevalence of one sector over another is made worse by a revenue sharing arrangement that 
allocates majority of the revenue to a non-producing centre at the detriment of producing areas (Uche and Uche, 
2004). The practice of a true fiscal federalism with respect to the oil revenue sharing formula in the country is a 
landmark case of the Nigerian state’s ineptitude to the developmental aspirations of the Niger Delta region. Oil 
revenue allocation has been the subject of much contention before and after Nigeria’s independence. Revenue 
allocations have varied from as much as 50%, arising from the fair regional autonomy in the first republic to an 
abysmal 10%, made worse by successive military juntas (see table below).  
Table 3.1 Oil Revenue Sharing Formula (1958-2001) 
Year  Federal State Local Special Projects Derivation Formula
4
 
1958 40% 60% 0% 0% 50% 
1968 80% 20% 0% 0% 10% 
1977 75% 22% 3% 0% 10% 
1982 55% 32.5% 10% 2.5% 10% 
1989 50% 24% 15% 11% 10% 
1995 48.5% 24% 20% 7.5% 13% 
2001 48.5% 24% 20% 7.5% 13% 
Source: Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal Commission, 2002 
What is abnormal with this oil revenue sharing formula is that while the unproductive consuming centre (i.e. the 
Federal Government at Abuja) enjoys the highest percentage share of the oil revenue, only 13% is left for the 
development of the oil bearing areas. However, the hypocrisy of the Nigerian government was revealed when the 
Igbetti Marble Revenue Sharing Formula (see table below) is examined vis-à-vis the oil revenue sharing formula 
above.  
Table 3.2 Igbetti Marble Revenue Sharing Formula 
S/N Stakeholders Proportion of Distribution 
1 Host Community 10% 
2 Local Govt. Council 10% 
3 Exploring Company 25% 
4 Federal Government 20% 
5 State Government 30% 
Total 100% 
Source: ERA/FoEN, 2000  
The Igbetti Marble formula came into existence when marble was discovered in Igbetti town in Ondo State in 
1979, and the then governor of the state, late Chief Michael Ajasin proposed the above formula, which was 
accepted by the Federal Government. The formula as reproduced above was exactly how the proceeds from the 
marble were distributed in a pre-determined proportion among the various stakeholders. The formula at least 
went down well with all the stakeholders. Therefore, one wonders why the Federal Government that adopted this 
formula for the Igbetti Marble mining turned around and unilaterally appropriates the resources from oil and gas 
producing communities of the Niger Delta. If this formula, consistent with fiscal federalism, were extended to 
the oil and gas industry, restiveness in the Niger Delta would not have lingered from 1970 till date. Instead, a 
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government policy which placed premium on revenue sharing has rendered non-oil bearing states in Nigeria 
unproductive (Ibeanu, 2008). As a panacea, derivation remains “the only revenue oriented principle of revenue 
allocation, unlike other principles such as population and equality of state, which are expenditure oriented. As 
revenue oriented criterion, it serves as a major factor for the promotion of the most desired “national interest” 
of the country. It creates satisfaction for the producer of the revenue by compensating him for his efforts, 
sufferings, deprivations and ecological damages associated with the generation of the revenue such as in the oil 
industry” (Okilo in Uche and Uche, 2004). The enormity of the unproductive Nigerian non-oil states became 
evident in April, 2005 when the various component states returned nothing to the federation account except the 
Niger Delta region (see table below).   
Table 3.3 Contributions of Zones (States) to Federation Accounts, April, 2005 
S/N Zones % Contribution of States to Mineral Revenue Total  
1 North-East 0.00  
 Adamawa 0.00  
 Borno  0.00  
 Gombe 0.00  
 Jigawa 0.00  
 Taraba  0.00  
 Yobe  0.00 0.00% 
2 North-West   
 Kaduna  0.00  
 Kano 0.00  
 Katsina 0.00  
 Kebbi 0.00  
 Zamfara 0.00  
 Sokoto 0.00 0.00% 
3. North-Central   
 Benue  0.00  
 FCT-Abuja 0.00  
 Kogi 0.00  
 Kwara 0.00  
 Nassarawa 0.00  
 Niger  0.00  
 Plateau  0.00 0.00% 
4.  South-East   
 Abia  1.31  
 Anambra  0.00  
 Ebonyi  0.00  
 Enugu  0.00  
 Imo   1.44 2.75% 
5.  South-West   
 Ekiti 0.00  
 Lagos 0.00  
 Ogun 0.00  
 Ondo 3.97  
 Osun 0.00  
 Oyo 0.00 3.97% 
6. South-South   
 Akwa Ibom 16.93  
 Bayelsa  23.42  
 Cross River    1.53  
 Delta  20.1  
 Edo    0.084  
 Rivers 29.58 91.64% 
Source: Tamuno, 2011, p.182 
3.2 Oil and Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta 
Loss in the productivity of arable land and fishing grounds emanating from oil exploration activities are major 
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concerns for oil bearing communities (Onduku, 2004; Ibeanu, 2008; Opukiri and Ibaba, 2008). Oil communities 
are fence-line neighbours to gas flaring sites vis-à-vis the oil spills that are common scenes to behold. It is 
reported that “(i) about 300 spills occur annually in the Niger Delta, (ii) less than 50% of these spills are 
cleaned up, and (iii) less than 25% of affected environment is remediated”(Emmanuel in Statoil, 2006:22). More 
so a human dimension, in form of environmental refugees, to environmental degradation fundamentally unsettles 
communities dependent on land and rivers for their sustenance (Opukiri and Ibaba, 2008). It is not dearth in 
relevant environmental guidelines and policies; instead implementation weaknesses, lapses or failure from 
relevant federal environmental agencies in Nigeria such as the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and 
National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) to checkmate such heinous 
pollutions is the cause for concern. The Niger Delta region stands the risk of un-sustainability in such a callous 
state of reckless environmental indifference from concerned authorities; a scenario the “Earth Magna Charta” 
requests “every individual and institution now think and act as a responsible trustee of Earth, seeking choices in 
ecology, economics and ethics that will provide a sustainable future, eliminate pollution, poverty and violence, 
awaken the wonder of life and foster peaceful progress in the human adventure" (McConnell, n.d). The 
indigenes of the Niger Delta region are aware of the poor state of their environment (see table 3.4), but 
indigene/NGO awareness and the sundry environmental guidelines are not enough safeguards to stem-out the 
huge environmental degradation that is being perpetrated on a daily basis by oil Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs). Instead the militarization of the region by the Nigerian state is identified as the modus operandi to 
ensure an uninterrupted spoliation of the Niger Delta environment secure oil rents/royalties. 
Table 3.4 Community Awareness of Environmental Problems in the Niger Delta 
S/N Environmental Problems 
Identified 
Perceived Effects of Environmental Problems 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Oil spillage  
(a) loss of soil fertility 
(b) pollution of fishing waters, leading to loss of fish population 
and other aquatic 
organisms 
(c) pollution of drinking water affect health of the people 
(d) associated with social strife 
(e) Negative effect on mangrove ecosystem. 
 
 
2 
 
 
Land acquisition  
(a) reduction of arable land 
(b) deforestation and land degradation 
(c) floods due to blockage of natural water courses as a result of 
construction of access roads and other facilities. 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Gas flaring  
(a) air pollution 
(b) loss of safe habitat 
(c) land becoming arid in near areas of gas flares 
(d) reduction of animal population in areas near gas flares 
(e) extinction of natural herbs and other non-timber forest 
products in areas near gas flares 
4 Environmental Impact Assessment 
Studies  
Communities are generally ignorant about EIA activities. They 
seem not to be aware of public forum for the discussion of the 
EIA report. 
5 Other environment-related problems 
and general problems of the oil 
industry (such as poor compensation, 
rural-urban migration, increasing 
city population, etc. 
(a) pressure on existing resources 
(b) high cost of living 
 (c) reduction of rural population 
(d) social vices and crime 
(e) corroding roofing sheets of buildings 
(f) population pressure on the ‘oil city’ 
Source: Orubu, et al, 2004, p.211 
The next section dwells on the role of the military/security agencies in ensuring a safe haven for business-as-
usual in the Niger Delta.   
3.3 The Military and the Niger Delta 
In the 1970s, soldiers were rarely seen in rural communities in the Niger Delta region, except for retirees that 
return home after a meritorious service to their fatherland. The military as an institution was then held in awe 
and respect. However, all of such has totally waned due to political and extra-legal purposes for which they are 
deployed to undertake in contemporary Nigeria. One such extra-legal military purpose for which the military is 
deployed is the enormous presence of the Joint Task Force (JTF), hurriedly put in place by the then Obasanjo 
regime to protect oil formations and petro-business in the Niger Delta region which for intent and purposes has 
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been detrimental to oil bearing communities. According to Ibeanu (2001, 2008) state avidity for oil 
rents/royalties is the raison d’être for the massive military presence in the Niger Delta region. 
Thus, scholars, civil society groups and NGOs have raised the concern that the avid interest in natural resources 
like oil by governments make oil states to exhibit predatory behaviour such as increased budgetary allocation to 
the defense sector (see appendix A), lack of long-term investment in education, and provision of health 
infrastructure for the citizenry, etc (Robinson 2001, Bergesen, et al 2000, Onduku, 2004, Schollaert and Van de 
gaer, 2009; Karl, 1997; Karl and Gary n.d; Ross, 2012). In 2003 aspersions were made against the Obasanjo 
government for making huge budgetary allocation for security when Nigeria was not in any threat environment 
except the militant activities in the Niger Delta. In what followed the militarization of the Niger Delta, 
interpreted as ensuring national security by the Nigerian government, is often interpreted as Nigerian state desire 
to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil proceeds. To this extent, a polarised conception of security exists between 
the Nigerian state and the oil bearing communities of the Niger Delta (Ibeanu, 2002/2003; 2008:215). To oil 
communities’ security is environmental sustenance, absence of deprivation, an equitable distribution of resources, 
etc. Whereas for oil states, like Nigeria, succumbing to such demands connotes docility, weakness and it is 
uncharacteristic. Not surprisingly oil states seldom embark on negotiations instead they are known for their use 
of lethal force. But the military option had never returned the expected gains which compelled the federal 
government to offer presidential amnesty package
5
 to the militants for disarmament (Akinola and Adesopo, 
2011). Does the amnesty package have all it takes to ensure sustainable peace in the oil rich region? The 
presidential amnesty for militant youths of the Niger Delta had indeed progressed in favour of the Nigerian 
government. Nigeria’s oil production had massively increased following the amnesty deal (Sayne, 2013; 
www.indexmundi.com) but there still exists an unprecedented presence of the JTF in all oil platforms in the 
region which signify a suspicion that all is still not well. The prevailing peace in the region is not sustainable as 
the environmental and livelihood circumstances that precipitated the erstwhile militant environment still stir the 
inhabitants in their faces (Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi, 2010; Aghedo, 2012). 
3.4 Oil and the Rule of Law in the Niger Delta  
It is expected that an ensuing democratic environment enthrone the dividends of a democratic space that 
translates into civil, economic and political rights (see Article 25, UDHR, 1948:9). But to what extent are such 
expectations not fulfilled in Third World countries? Development scholars decipher sundry elements such as 
religion (Huntington, 1993), colonial legacies (Baro, 1999), ethnicity, human rights abuses (Jungk in Clapham 
and Jerbi, 2008) as being responsible. Which of these is responsible for Nigeria’s present comatose state of 
affairs? It will be recalled that Nigeria’s recent match towards democratic dispensation is over ten years now yet 
expectations are still earnestly made of the democratic space impacting on the wellbeing of the average Nigerian. 
The enormous wealth Nigeria’s current democratic government received from petroleum is ordinarily expected 
to impact positively on her citizens but oil windfalls are never translated into ensuring economic development in 
the country. The plight of the oil rich Niger Delta, in such circumstances, is frightened with gross inequities that 
manifest in form of income inequality (Baro 1999), unemployment, social dislocations and environmental 
degradation (Watts, 2008), as shown in the following sub-sections:  
3.4.1 Employment  
Government regulations on employment of indigenes in the oil and gas sector are crystal clear. It is 100% for the 
lower rank, while 75% goes for the middle level workers. Sadly, these regulations are never honoured by oil 
TNCs. The employment roll-call of most companies is never encouraging at all (table below 3.6). Shell and 
Nigeria state owned NNPC could not publish the share of Nigerians in their employment. Curiously, one would 
pause to inquire into the employment behaviour of oil TNCs in Nigeria.        
Table 3.5 Employment Record of oil TNCs in Nigeria 
  Company   Employees     Share of Nigerians 
Chevron          2,000              90% 
Mobil          1,900              96% 
NNPC        16,000 Not reported 
Shell        10,000 Not reported 
Statoil                43              95% 
Petronas                30 Not reported 
Source: Amadi, et al, 2006, p.12  
In this respect, a number of reasons have been adduced for the employment structure in the oil industry. For 
example, while identifying ethnicity politics as the motive of the employment colouration of a number of oil 
companies in Nigeria, Darah (2003) argued that “the bureaucratic and administrative middle levels reserved for 
Nigerians are occupied by people from the three favoured ethno-national regions of the North, the East, and the 
West. For example, Shell is a vineyard of the power blocs of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba West and non-oil 
producing sections of Igbo-speaking Eastern states. Chevron is a virtual colony of the Yoruba, so much so that 
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Yoruba language is the lingua-franca in the Escravos terminal of the company. Of course the job recruitment 
and award of juicy contracts are done in Lagos and Abuja”. Amadi, et al (2006) identified deliberate 
falsification of work permits as a practice common among oil TNCs in cornering jobs for expatriate staff for job 
positions that are ordinarily meant for Nigerians. He stated that “the big oil companies cheat when it comes to 
allocation of jobs to Nigerian nationals. Several spoke about the quota rules for ex-pats vs. Nigerian nationals 
on different levels of seniority, and how these rules are broken, when international oil companies bring in 
foreign workers to do Nigerian quota jobs where qualified Nigerian nationals are available. The trade union 
representatives said the most common way of doing this was through making false qualification statements in the 
work permit applications, so that they could bring in, say a drilling technician on an engineer quota”.  
What is missing in Nigeria’s brand of federalism is simply justice, especially justice as fairness (equitable 
sharing of advantages and disadvantages arising from oil exploration), justice as equitable distribution (equitably 
distributing oil proceeds), and justice as human dignity (issues of minimum rights for a dignified living) (Sachs, 
2003). In a nutshell, the totality of the Niger Delta question and protests emanating thereof may be likened to 
what Ukah (2013: 132) described in the following interrogative dynamics:  
                               What is the right to life without the right to eat? What is the right to breathe without 
the right to clean air? What is the right to rest without a quiet atmosphere? What is 
the right to good health without good Medicare? What is the right to development 
without good education? What is the right to patriotism without the right to 
participation? What is the right to security without the protection of the law? In a 
word, what is the freedom without substantive liberty? And specifically what is the 
right to peace without the right to Justice? 
3.4.2 Infrastructure  
The Niger Delta environment is a peculiar one. It is a region of difficulty bedeviled with first nature geographical 
challenges arising from its remoteness and challenging topography that makes communities segmented and 
development worrisome (Udo, 1970), with a range of second nature geographic challenges relating to 
infrastructural development, service delivery, etc (Naude, 2007; Higgins, 2009). Though, these striking 
geographic concerns are acknowledged, the abysmal developmental and infrastructural lag in the Niger Delta is 
too worrisome to behold after over fifty years of oil exploration in the region.  
Successive Nigerian governments have had cause to set-up government ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs) and development agencies (the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission, 
OMPADEC and the Niger Delta Development Commission, NDDC) to oversee the infrastructural development 
of the Niger Delta yet, the government that set up these development agencies exhibit glaring inconsistencies. 
For example, government monetary releases to the development agencies reveal a lot (see table 3.6).  
Table 3.6 Federal Government Releases to NDDC 2001-2009 (#’000,000)  
 
Year  
Budget Allocation 
       # 
Releases 
       # 
Releases % Budget 
 
Releases % Federal Govt. Rev. 
2001    10,000      7,500   75% 1.40% 
2002    12,650    11,385   90% 1.85% 
2003    10,064    10,064 100% 1.40% 
2004    14,000      7,000   50% 1.33% 
2005    60,150    17,357   29% 1.20% 
2006    96,250    26,130   26% 1.13% 
2007    26,565    24,000   19% 1.10% 
2008    79,200    19,050   25% 1.30% 
2009    27,120    27,120 100% 1.50% 
Total  426,000 156,484   36%    - 
Source: Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal Commission, Abuja, February 9, 2009  
Investigations reveal that the stifling financial constraints on the development agencies had rendered them 
impotent. The resultant effect is that communities in the Niger Delta live in perpetual abject poverty, want and 
despair.  
 
4. Violence against Basic Rights  
Issues of basic rights in oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta amount to four basic complementary 
duties/responses from oil TNCs: respect for communities, protect the environment, promote human rights and 
fulfill signed Memorandum of Understandings; functions oil TNCs have so far not fared well (Aaron, 2012). 
Issues of basic rights in the Niger Delta simply amount to demands for basic life sustaining amenities from the 
Nigerian state and oil TNCs, which among others include - basic education, healthcare centres, employment, etc. 
In a true federalism, such demands are guaranteed and non-negotiable (Sagay, 2003, 2011). However, in Nigeria 
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such demands are not guaranteed in oil communities and even where they are provided it is far in between and 
always achieved through protest. A clean environment is a guaranteed right (Boyle, 2012). The Niger Delta 
environment is not only severely threatened (UNEP, 2011) but a recurrent issue area of protest from oil 
communities. State owned regulatory institutions such as DPR, NESREA, the NNPC and the Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources, etc, are either structurally weak or so compromised that they look away when diverse 
abuses are perpetrated (Schubert, 2006) thereby serving “global capital expressed in petro-business” (Ibeanu, 
2001:13).   
 
5. Conclusion   
The adverse influences of oil are copious in all the failures identified above as manifestations of selective 
federalism in Nigeria. Oil based federalism in Nigeria has, indeed, failed the Niger Delta region. Also, the oil 
motivated granting of presidential amnesty to ex-militants has, though, recorded increased oil production which 
favoured the Nigeria government; the resulting peace from the amnesty package is yet to fully impact on the 
indigenes of the Niger Delta (Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi, 2010). Therefore, to many indigenes the exercise is a 
ruse or as they wonder, what explains the illegal refineries that currently litter the creeks of the Niger Delta? The 
issues that compelled restiveness in the first instance are still commonplace: lack of employment, environmental 
degradation, threatened livelihood sources, glaring absence of basic amenities, desecration of cultural 
values/land, social dislocation, etc. As long as the real and perceived injustices to the Niger Delta continue, 
peace will ever remain unsustainable (Ibeanu, 2008; Sagay, n.d). Sustainable peace in the Niger Delta depends 
largely on the practice of true federalism, but, where such expectations remain illusive, Nigeria’s federalism will 
become obsolete “because it would prove unable to cope with...outstanding problems…to satisfy living demands” 
(Laski, 2005). 
 
6. Recommendations 
a. A true federalism centred on a fiscal federalism where derivation is its corner stone be made medium 
for promoting the Nigeria project forward,  
b. As a basic requirement of economic democracy (Sodaro, et al, 2001), the Nigerian government should 
provide the dividends of democracy, especially job creation, 
c. The political leadership of the Niger Delta states must enthrone political and economic accountability to 
the region that has received so much revenue from the federation account, while negotiating for a higher 
revenue allocation formula or the ultimate: resource control, and,  
d. Oil TNCs should collaborate with oil communities in securing oil installations, as employing those who 
you think are guilty of misconduct is a sure way of preventing the misconduct.     
 
Notes 
1. The phrase false/selective federalism as used in the paper represent state conducts that run contrary to a 
true federalism, which promotes accelerated economic development, unifies and binds people together, 
triggers intellectual dialogue and provokes a healthy rivalry in revenue generation. See Chijioke, et al, 
2012,   
2. The concept of Triple Helix, see Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1997) and Etzkowitz (2002)  
3. A good that is both nonrivalrous and non-excludable in consumption. See UNIDO, 2008:7  
4. The derivation formula refers to the % of the revenue oil producing states retain from taxes on oil and 
other natural resources produced in the state, 
5. The Presidential Amnesty was proclaimed on June 25, 2009 for a period of sixty days.   
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Appendix A 
Trends in Defence Expenditure in Nigeria, 1986-2004 
 
Year  
Nominal 
Defense Exp. 
N’ million 
Exp. Per capita 
N’ million 
Inflation 
Rate (%) 
Real Defense 
Exp. N’ 
million 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
Nigeria’s 
Pop.  
GDP N’ 
million 
1986          825.700   10.87     5.40      152.780       -   75.996   70,806.40 
1987       2,155.000   27.52   10.20      211.270 160.990   78.315   71,194.90 
1988       1,720.100   21.28   56.00        44.910 (20.180)   80.839   77,733.20 
1989       2,219.300   25.12   50.50        54.260   29.020   88.350   83,179.00 
1990       2,285.200   26.54     7.50      304.690     2.970   86.115   92,238.50 
1991       2,711.700   30.47   12.90      208.590    18.660   88.992   94,235.30 
1992       2,677.100   29.24   44.50        60.160 (1.280)   91.570   97,019.90 
1993       6,381.600   67.75   57.30      111.570 138.380   94.189   99,604.20 
1994       6,607.700   68.20   57.00      115.920      3.540   96.883 100,936.70 
1995       9,360.400   93.93   73.10      130.010    41.660   99.653 103,078.60 
1996     15,686.200 152.84   29.10      535.370    67.580 102.633 106,600.60 
1997     18,285.900 172.99     8.50   2,151.280    16.570 105.702 109,972.50 
1998     25,161.900 231.14   10.00   2,516.190    37.600 108.862 113,509.00 
1999     24,566.900 219.12     6.60   3,722.260 (2.360) 112.117 116,655.50 
2000     37,490.400 328.83     6.90   5,433.390    52.610 115.772 121,207.80 
2001     63,471.700 534.40   18.90   3,358.290    69.300 118.772 126,323.80 
2002  108, 147.600 885.23 885.23   6,888.380    70.390 122.169 131,789.80 
2003     61,723.300 491.18 491.18   5,462.240 (42.390) 125.663 136,460.00 
2004     85,047.400 657.97 657.97   4,383.890    37.790 129.257 145,380.00 
Mean     25,080.27 214.19 130.99 12,994.96    35.81   
                              Source: Olowononi, and Aiyedogbon, 2008 
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